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On 30 October 1918, Arthur Ashdown Green, a wireless 
operator on Triangle Island, British 
Columbia, received a bone-chilling 
signal from a foundering ship. 
“Hold’s full of water,” Michael John 
Neary, the ship’s wireless operator 
desperately transmitted, “For God’s 
Sake send help.” Nothing further 
was heard, suggesting that the ship 
had already slipped below the cold 
and storm-tossed surface. One can 
only speculate what horrible images 
haunted Green at that moment, 
the more so since he and his fellow 
operators had a heart-wrenching 
decision to make. W.C. Neary, one 
of their colleagues at the station, 
was asleep in the next room. After 
a short discussion they came to the 
conclusion that they would wait until 
morning to tell Neary that his brother 
– along with 30 eight other shipmates 
from the Canadian warship HMCS 
Galiano (as well as one civilian) - had 
likely fallen victim to a particularly 
vicious Pacific storm.1
 Galiano was an unlucky ship. 
Aside from the unfortunate distinction 
of being the only Canadian warship 
lost during the First World War, she 
also struck a rock off the appropriately 
named Disappointment Inlet and 
grounded twice – all within the span 
of three years. A portion of this article, 
therefore, will argue that there was 
actually a correlation between these 
incidents and Galiano’s sinking. It will 
also show how these incidents were 
reflective of the navigation challenges 
that the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) 
faced on the West Coast in an era 
before radar, modern navigation aids 
and forecasting equipment. Yet there 
are other aspects of Galiano’s history 
that deserve closer scrutiny. Little 
has been written on Canadian Pacific 
coastal operations between 1914 and 
1918 (most likely since that presence 
was so small), and as a result a study 
of Galiano is critical because her 
evolution from a Fisheries Protection 
Ship into a naval vessel gives new 
insights into the life, origins, and 
roots of Canada’s West Coast reserve 
navy. 
 For the first 43 years of its 
existence Canada did not have a navy 
of its own. Instead it relied on the 
Department of Marine and Fisheries 
for all activities related to Canada’s 
oceans and inland waters including 
the maintenance of navigation 
aids, enforcement of regulations 
and the upkeep of hydrographical 
requirements. Protecting Canadian 
sovereignty and fisheries was also 
one of the department’s key roles, 
and thanks to American poaching in 
the second half of the 19th century 
it was a task that represented a 
constant problem for the young 
Dominion. As the department’s 
maritime vanguard, the Fisheries 
Protection Service,  which had 
undergone a significant expansion 
from one to nine ships in 1886, was 
the key organization responsible for 
containing these encroachments. By 
1904 the Fisheries Protection Service 
had grown even further to a total 
eight armed “cruisers,” and the rest 
of the government fleet included six 
icebreakers, and 18 other vessels. 
Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier saw 
a need for Canada to have its own 
national navy and logically it should 
be developed from those civilian 
vessels.2 
 Increasing tensions in Europe, 
particularly from an upstart Germany 
and its growing naval ambitions, had 
forced the Royal Navy (RN) to turn its 
attention to home waters and abandon 
many of its imperial commitments. 
Fleet units and personnel were 
subsequently reassigned from the RN 
bases in Halifax and Esquimalt, and 
that fact – along with Laurier’s desire 
to promote nationalism through the 
Abstract: HMCS Galiano is remembered 
mainly for being the Royal Canadian 
Navy’s only loss during the First World 
War. However, a close examination 
of this ship’s history not only reveals 
important insights into the origins and 
identity of the West Coast’s seagoing 
naval reserve, but also the hazards and 
navigational challenges that confronted 
the men who served in these waters. 
The aim of this article, therefore, is to 
determine how particular navigation 
c ha l l enges  a f fected  Gal iano ’ s 
commanding officer to the point where 
they contributed to the ship’s sinking. 
It also proposes that the waters of 
British Columbia were witness to a 
remarkable evolution that effectively 
gave birth to a proto sea-going reserve 
fleet on the West Coast well before 
the establishment of the modern naval 
reserves in 1923. 
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6creation of truly Canadian institutions 
– was forcing the young country 
to develop the means to protect its 
own interests. As a result, Laurier, 
along with the minister of marine 
and fisheries, Raymond Préfontaine, 
revitalized an earlier plan that called 
for the Fisheries Protection Service 
slowly to be converted into a fighting 
force. This would not only provide 
the core organization for a naval 
service, but it would also create a 
base from which a future naval militia 
could be trained. 3 To achieve these 
aims Préfontaine would champion 
the Naval Militia Bill of 1904, while 
the Fisheries Protection Service 
acquired two new cruisers that were 
to be “run like crisply disciplined 
navy ships.”4 
 The failure of Préfontaine’s bill, 
which, had it become law would have 
laid the foundation for a Canadian 
naval reserve, was a serious setback 
for the nation’s maritime ambitions. 
More bad news followed as the 
department was rocked by scandalous 
charges suggesting that its senior 
managers were incompetent and its 
sailors demoralized. Whether the 
latter allegations were accurate was 
hard to determine, but stories about 
low wages and unfair patronage 
appointments where politicians had 
the final say on the hiring of personnel 
were hard to dismiss. In fact, some 
argued that this not only resulted in 
crews of questionable quality, but 
also led to an exodus of men who 
would take their Canadian training 
and use it to make a better future for 
themselves in the United States Navy. 
More severe criticisms, however, 
were heaped upon the department 
itself, which British officials decried 
as “one of the worst-run ministries in 
a country they described as one not 
noted for efficient, principled public 
administration.”5
 The findings of the 1908 royal 
commission on public administration 
spurred Laurier and Préfontaine’s 
successor, L.P. Brodeur, to clean 
shop at the Department of Marine 
and Fisheries. Commander O.G.V. 
Spain, an ex-RN officer who had 
commanded the Fisheries Protection 
Service as the Director of Marine 
Services since 1893, was one of 
the first to go. His replacement, a 
Canadian-born retired RN officer, 
Rear Admiral Charles Kingsmill, 
was a well-connected and capable 
man who, along with the new deputy 
minister, G.J. Desbarats, would get 
the department running smoothly. 
So much so, in fact, that when the 
Canadian navy came into existence 
on 4 May 1910 there was no doubt 
that Kingsmill would become the 
Director of the Naval Service (DNS) in 
addition to his continuing command 
of the Fisheries Protection Service. 
As a result, the fate and organization 
of the navy and Fisheries Protection 
Service were closely linked and 
Kingsmill certainly had his work 
cut out for him. Ambitious plans to 
acquire a sizable naval fleet were 
sadly reduced to the purchase of the 
two aged RN cruisers, HMCS Rainbow 
and Niobe, while the militarization of 
the Fisheries Protection Service not 
only occurred at a slow pace but its 
future acquisition program was also 
limited to a handful of new ships. 
 As small as that expansion may 
have been, Robert Mayes Pope 
was nonetheless excited when he 
discovered in early 1913 that the 
Fisheries Protection Service was 
acquiring two new ships to augment 
its small West Coast fleet. And since 
the RCN was responsible for the 
administration of this organization 
and the direction of its vessels he 
contacted Kingsmill, asking that he 
be considered for command. Nor did 
he stop there. Having learned that 
Kingsmill was coming to the West 
Coast in May, Pope made a point 
of calling upon the DNS in effort to 
plead his case in person. Kingsmill 
liked what he heard. In fact, Pope was 
so eager that he told the DNS: 
… he [Pope] is prepared to pay 
his passage to England, if he is 
favourably considered, and to bring 
out one of these [new] ships, waiving 
all claim on the Agents for return 
passage to England. I think that this 
matter might easily be arranged with 
the Builders, and it would be of great 
advantage to us to have the Captain 
in the Ship from the start.6
“The Navy Plan, 1909. For Canada and 
the Empire.” A political cartoon by 
Fergus Kyle published in the Toronto 
Globe showing Wilfrid Laurier on the 
bridge of a ship.
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7Kingsmill was equally impressed 
with Pope’s sea-going career which 
dated back to 1884. Although Pope 
had been ashore for almost nine 
years, Kingsmill was quick to point 
out to the deputy minister that this 
candidate had extensive time with 
various steamship companies, the 
Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) and 
the Canadian marine and fisheries 
department, which included time 
(mostly as a second mate) on ships 
sailing from Great Britain to India 
as well as Esquimalt to Africa. He 
also served as a lieutenant on four 
warships. While Pope’s experience 
ended after he had risen to the rank 
of first mate on the “Dominion 
Government Ship” Quadra between 
April 1902 and May 1904, Kingsmill 
emphasized to the deputy minister 
that all these appointments had 
resulted in a slew of “excellent 
certificates” and positive performance 
reviews, adding that Pope “is a 
man of some education, and in my 
opinion would be a suitable Officer 
to command one of [our new] ships.”7 
 Such accolades certainly helped 
Pope’s application, but it may have 
been age that served him best.8 
Kingsmill wanted relatively younger 
men to command these vessels, and 
since one of the frontrunners was 
close to retirement age, the forty-
two year old Pope suddenly found 
himself in the second slot behind 
the top candidate, Mr. Holmes 
Newcomb, who was already an 
experienced officer with the Fisheries 
Protection Service.9 Indeed, Kingsmill 
coached Pope on how to play the 
patronage game associated with 
the politicized appointments to the 
Fisheries Protection Service.10 Getting 
Pope a command appointment 
nevertheless proved exceedingly 
difficult, particularly since Kingsmill 
had warned the deputy minister that 
“from personal conversations on the 
[West] Coast we are likely to get a great 
many recommendations on behalf of 
old gentlemen whose principle time 
for some years has been spent in 
Victoria or Vancouver.”11 The key to 
Pope’s appointment, however, rested 
with the Member of Parliament from 
his constituency in Nanaimo, the 
Honourable F.H. Shepherd. Shepherd 
had no problem recommending Pope, 
but he reminded Kingsmill that:
The patronage of the cruiser destined 
for the southern waters falls to the 
member of Naniamo [Shepherd], 
and that for the cruiser destined 
for the northern waters of BC to 
the member for Comox-Atlin. The 
Estevan, and Quadra of Victoria falls 
to the member for Victoria. This is by 
mutual arrangement. Captain Pope 
being a member in my Constituency 
I have pleasure in backing up his 
application. I trust when the other 
appointments are being made that 
you will kindly consider the above 
mutual arrangement. 12
But Kingsmill was in no position to 
make any promises and he said as 
much to Shepherd:
I do not see exactly how this is going 
to be worked, because the Cruisers 
are destined for work all over the 
British Columbia Coast. Perhaps it 
would be as well that they should 
be allotted to the Members by name. 
The Ships “Estevan” and “Quadra” 
do not come under this Department 
at all.13 
In the end, Kingsmill  secured 
Shepherd’s support, and that was 
all that mattered. Pope was slated 
for command of the government 
Rear Admiral Charles E. Kingsmill, 
a Canadian-born former Royal Navy 
officer, commanded the Fisheries 
Protection Service and was appointed 
the Director of the Naval Service upon 
the creation of the Canadian Navy on 4 
May 1910.
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8ship Galiano while Newcomb had 
already been given her sister ship, 
Malaspina.14
 Much like today’s Maritime 
Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDV) and 
ORCAs, the Auxiliary Patrol Ships 
(APS) Galiano and Malaspina were 
constructed to civilian standards so 
as to be “as simple as practicable,” 
and had their naval armament 
added separately from the original 
construction.15 Built by Dublin 
Dockyard Company and noted for 
the innovation of being “electrically 
lighted throughout,” the 160-foot 
long, 26½-foot wide, and 700-ton 
Galiano and Malaspina were billed 
as very modern ships.16 That Pope 
was taking over such a new ship 
after a lengthy absence from the sea 
did cause the DNS some concern. 
Kingsmill told the deputy minister 
that this new officer would need 
thorough refresher training before 
taking charge.17 The deputy minister 
agreed and Pope was informed 
that in the three months prior to 
Galiano’s arrival on 27 February 1914 
he would receive mentoring from 
Newcomb as well as a refresher 
on life at sea through service on 
the Roman as well as the recently 
accepted Malaspina.18 It was a good 
introduction particularly since the 
men and ships of the protection 
service often worked closely together 
while patrolling up and down British 
Columbia’s coastal waters looking 
for illegal fishing activities. Wartime 
conditions, however, would offer 
Pope and his crew – along with the 
other west coast Fisheries Protection 
vessels – new challenges.
 Eighteen days after Canada went 
war with Germany in August 1914, 
Commander Charles Trousdale, RN, 
conducted a survey of the forces, 
facilities, and personnel available 
to the RCN for the protection of the 
Pacific Coast. Barely four years had 
passed since the birth of the RCN and 
it was clear from Trousdale’s report 
that the service was still very much 
in its infancy. With a total strength 
of less than 350 officers and ratings 
and Rainbow its only true West Coast 
warship, the regular force RCN was 
desperately short of personnel and 
ships. The situation was indeed 
grim, as aside from Rainbow the 
defence of the West Coast rested in 
the hands of the remnants of the old 
British Pacific Squadron (the sloops 
HMS Algerine and Shearwater), as 
well as a ragtag fleet consisting of 
ships from the Canadian Fisheries 
Protection, Queen Charlotte Island 
Fisheries, former Grand Trunk Pacific 
company, and civilian chartered 
vessels (collectively these ships were 
the Galiano, Malaspina, Newington, 
Rest l e s s ,  Estevan ,  Prote s i l aus , 
Prince George (hospital ship), Aid 
and Gannett). There was also the 
submarines CC 1 and CC 2, which, 
originally having been built by a 
Seattle company for the Chilean navy, 
were independently procured by the 
province of British Columbia at the 
time of the declaration of war.19 
 Without the sailors to man 
most of these ships, the RCN’s West 
Coast fleet was certainly fortunate 
to have the Fisheries Protection 
Service as well as a cadre of men, 
who, as members of the Royal 
Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve 
(RNCVR), were more than willing 
to take up the slack.20 That these 
individuals were available for service 
was not the product of deliberate 
planning. Since the previous attempts 
to establish a naval militia had failed 
HMCS Galiano
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9the Naval Service Act of 1910 did 
have provisions for the creation of a 
naval reserve and volunteer reserve, 
but a lack of government funding was 
making it difficult for the young RCN 
to ensure its own survival let alone 
the creation of a part-time force. Once 
again, much like the acquisition of 
the submarines, CC1 and CC2, British 
Columbians did what they could 
to help. In particular, some keen 
Victoria business and yachtsmen, 
most notably Dr. J. Harper, R. Ponder, 
G. Edwardes, and S. Greary, sent an 
application to Prime Minister Robert 
Borden in May 1913 asking permission 
to establish a local volunteer reserve 
unit. It took another year before a 
Privy Council order granted this 
request by authorizing the formation 
of the RNCVR, but that did not stop 
these enthusiasts – most of who 
did not even have uniforms – from 
conducting training and rudimentary 
drill nights on their own and without 
pay. 21
 Although one scholar would 
aptly characterize Rear-Admiral 
Walter Hose’s establishment of a 
truly national naval reserve force in 
1923 as a “restart” of these earlier 
pioneering efforts, the standard 
historical narrative often portrays 
the RNCVR as little more than an 
imperial defence force designed to 
augment the Royal Naval (RN) and 
RCN in times of war. 22 There is some 
truth to this interpretation as the 
RNCVR did in fact serve as a nation-
wide manning pool that took civilians 
who would fight for the duration 
of hostilities-only and directly fed 
them into the immediate war-time 
naval requirements of the Empire. 
And it could be argued that it is for 
this reason that the RNCVR, which 
would come to represent 8,000 of the 
RCN’s 9,000 wartime personnel, did 
not survive as a national institution 
once the emergency created by the 
First World War was over. Upon 
closer examination, however, there is 
compelling evidence which strongly 
suggests that the RNCVR – along with 
segments of a militarized Fisheries 
Protection Service – came together 
to become more of a sea-going 
Canadian reserve force on the Pacific 
coast (as well as a pivotal component 
to the province’s maritime defence) 
than previously believed. 
 The citizens of British Columbia 
had good reason to worry about their 
maritime security. The province’s 
remote location from either Imperial 
or Canadian naval re-enforcements 
ensured that sufficient forces would 
not be readily available to counter 
potential encroachments by hostile 
raiders. It was the fear of such danger, 
in addition to the province’s sense of 
isolation, which triggered a desire to 
augment the federal government’s 
relatively miniscule presence on the 
West Coast through the purchase of 
CC1 and CC2 as well as the formation 
of the RNCVR. Indeed, providing 
for British Columbia’s maritime 
security requirements was not easy 
for either an aging Empire or an 
inspiring young Dominion. Laurier’s 
and Kingsmill’s vision of turning the 
Fisheries Protection Service into a 
paramilitary force certainly helped 
to provide some measure of security 
to the West Coast, but it was not 
nearly enough. Unlike Kingsmill, 
who had looked to the Fisheries 
Protection Service to act as a local 
reserve defence force, Hose was 
more in tune with what the patriotic 
citizens of British Columbia were 
trying to achieve with the creation of 
the RNCVR. While holding the rank 
of commander and having captained 
Rainbow since June 1911, Hose did 
what he could to support their 
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Above right: HM Ships Algerine , 
Shearwater and Egeria at anchor in 
Comox Harbour, BC circa 1909.
Right: HMS Algerine with submarines 
CC1  and CC2  a longside,  HMCS 
Shearwater astern - circa 1914 - 1917.
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10
fledgling efforts, going so far as to 
give the Pacific RNCVR opportunities 
to train at the Esquimalt naval base. 
He also made his ship available to 
them and allowed his officers and 
petty officers to act as instructors. 23 
His efforts and belief in the RNCVR 
paid off. Within weeks of the onset 
of hostilities, 95 of the RNCVR’s 140 
members in British Columbia found 
themselves in seagoing billets where 
they filled desperate crew shortages 
on Rainbow as well as the former 
civilian vessels Aid and Prince George. 
Nor did their direct contribution to 
Canada’s west coast sea going fleet 
stop there as in time they would also 
provide entire ships’ companies for 
the submarines CC1 and CC2 along 
with various Fisheries Protection 
ships such as Galiano. 24
 The RNCVR wasted no time 
making their Pacific presence felt. 
With the Shearwater and Algerine off 
the coast of Mexico and in the same 
general proximity as the German 
cruisers Leipzig and Nuremburg, naval 
authorities in Ottawa borrowed 
from the traditions of the RN by 
telling the under-manned and 
hopelessly outclassed Rainbow to 
go to their rescue with the stirring 
words: “remember Nelson and 
the British Navy. All Canada is 
watching.”25 Hose, who made a 
potentially suicidal dash towards the 
area, fully recognized that over one 
third of Rainbow’s crew (which was 
already sailing at half her normal 
complement) consisted of local 
RNCVRs:
I am sure that we shall put Leipzig 
out of business in a fairly short time 
after we get within 6,000 yds. of her, 
and I can assure you that I shall get 
into that position at the very earliest 
opportunity after I hear that war is 
declared. …The Naval Volunteers 
have been invaluable, fortunately 
I had already embarked 46 for the 
Bering Sea Cruise before the war 
news came. 26
 Hose suggested that the search 
for Algerine and Shearwater would 
HMCS Rainbow (top) entering Esquimalt Harbour, BC, for first time 7 November 
1910. HMS Shearwater is dressed overall to mark the occasion.
Right: Commander Walter Hose on the quarterdeck of HMCS Rainbow.
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not have been possible without the 
volunteers’ assistance:
I am dreadfully anxious about 
Algerine + Shearwater, if they have 
steamed straight along for Esquimalt 
and the Germans have been chasing 
them we cannot meet in time. It is 
like a nightmare this running to save 
those two ships with the hopeless 
feeling I have about it if the Germans 
are on their tracks. But I assure you 
that of those two ships are lost to 
us either interned, captures or sunk 
that the Nuremberg and Leipzig 
will be brought to book by Rainbow 
as early as is humanly possible, to 
reach those two ships is the one and 
only objective in my mind, and by 
Heavens nobody shall laugh at “the 
Rainbow” again. I wish you could see 
the ships company, not one sick all 
as happy as larks and working like 
Trojans, the Volunteers are splendid, 
it is wonderful how they stand the 
work of trimming down coal, etc 
considering it is all so much harder 
than anything they ever have to do 
in their lives. …My word it was a 
fortunate day for Canada when 
she decided to approve the Naval 
Volunteers for we could not have 
been here now without them.27
 Hose certainly appreciated the 
value of Canadian citizen-sailors and 
his desire to develop a truly national 
reserve force in the 1920s clearly can 
be traced to these early experiences 
with the West Coast RNCVR. Yet 
even before Hose’s vision took root, 
the West Coast was well on its way to 
developing a seagoing reserve force 
of its own.
 Although no German warship 
would come within 2,500 miles 
of British Columbia, the fear of 
commerce raiding or even the direct 
bombardment of Vancouver and 
Victoria was only eased once the 
powerful RN Bristol class cruiser, 
HMS Newcastle, arrived in provincial 
waters later in the month. 28 Japan’s 
entry into the war as a British ally 
brought some comfort to a nervous 
West Coast population, but that 
did not mean there was no longer a 
Canadian naval requirement in these 
waters. Regular patrols of the area 
were still needed and this was a duty 
that would fall largely to the Galiano, 
Malaspina, Newington and Restless. 
While beginning the war as Fisheries 
Protection ships, it would not take 
long before RNCVRs would integrate 
with this small force of patrol vessels 
to such an extent between 1914 and 
1917 that they would collectively 
become a proto West Coast sea-going 
reserve fleet. 
 The concept  that  a  proto-
naval reserve fleet was serving the 
waters off British Columbia is new, 
particularly since accounts within the 
literature, which are the product of 
research originally done in the 1940s, 
generally portray these vessels’ 
conversion to naval ships as a sudden 
affair that only came about when they 
were commissioned into the navy 
in late 1917. Moreover, this older 
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interpretation further argues 
that Galiano and Malaspina, as well 
as the Restless and Newington, were 
actually civilian-manned Canadian 
g o v e r n m e n t  s h i p s  t h a t  o n l y 
occasionally conducted military 
operations throughout the course of 
the war.29 Yet the evidence that these 
Fisheries Protection Vessels had been 
effectively converted into proto-naval 
reserve ships well before the time of 
their commissioning into the RCN is 
strong. 
 Galiano was particularly quick 
off the mark in this regard. When 
Kingsmill was recommending Pope 
for the command of the Galiano he 
advised the deputy minister that 
he wanted a man who could be a 
disciplinarian and had had naval 
training; most notably because the 
DNS knew that as much as one-
third of the crew would immediately 
consist of naval personnel who would 
be lent to the Fisheries Protection 
Service. Pope proved the perfect 
candidate.30 Soon after the start of the 
war Pope used his RNR experience 
to institute a naval routine on 
board Galiano, and as a result 
his rules tended to be stricter 
than the other captains in the 
Fisheries Protection Service. 
Nor did he hesitate to purge 
his ship of troublemakers 
and non-conformists, as 
over a one year period 
Pope dismissed at least 
seven men on various 
charges of drunkenness, 
incompetence, desertion, 
r e f u s i n g  d u t y  a n d 
i n s u b o r d i n a t i o n . 
A l t h o u g h  P o p e 
undoubtedly had good reason 
to release these men, his routine went 
too far for some civilian members of 
the crew; so much so, in fact, that the 
ship experienced an abnormally high 
number of resignations during the 
spring of 1915.31 Others decided to 
join their naval crewmates who were 
on loan to the Fisheries Protection 
Service by enrolling in the RNCVR. 
As a result, Galiano’s crew was taking 
on such a reserve flavour that there 
were only a small handful of men 
who had to be transferred from 
the Fisheries Protection Service to 
the RNCVR when the vessel was 
officially commissioned into the navy 
(and in doing so changing her “APS” 
designation to “HMCS.”)
 Although Galiano did perform 
civilian fisheries patrol duties for the 
bulk of her sea-time throughout the 
war – the highlight of which came on 
17 August 1915 when she seized the 
US registered, Solano, fishing within 
Canadian waters – she actually 
found herself conducting functions 
that were more military in nature 
as the war progressed. Acting as an 
examination vessel, which involved 
intercepting ships to inspect their 
papers and cargoes, was another of 
her primary roles; although it was 
ironic that the “regulations of traffic 
in time of war” (as well as fears of 
upsetting a neutral United States) 
led to a somewhat unusual policy 
where Galiano’s six-pound quick 
firing gun would be removed while 
she was performing these duties.32 
Minesweeping was an additional key 
task that Galiano as well as Malaspina 
practiced at least once or twice per 
year, while the Newington, on the 
other hand, had been fitted out as 
a minelayer so that she could “lay a 
defensive minefield in the Johnstone 
Strait, should the need arise.”33 Other 
typical responsibilities that Galiano 
performed included re-supplying 
the province’s wireless stations, 
ferrying military VIPs to various 
ports, responding to search and 
rescue calls, delivering confidential 
mail, and acting as a target tow for 
Rainbow. 
 Galiano was also called upon to 
conduct some rather unorthodox 
missions. The fact 75 percent of the 
province’s army deserters had sought 
refuge in coastal ports that were hard 
to reach from land resulted in cruises 
where parties of Military Police 
joined both Galiano and Malaspina in 
an effort to track these men down.34 
While such sweeps did lead to 
numerous arrests, another unique 
search – this time involving reports 
of marooned German infiltrators 
– proved fruitless.35 Requests that 
Pope be given the powers of a justice 
of the peace so as to maintain order 
and deal with “[a] certain amount 
of unrest among [the] inhabitants 
of the Queen Charlotte Islands 
since the outbreak of hostilities” 
show that Galiano also played a 
critical constabulary function.36 An 
important point emerges; namely, 
that with a few exceptions, Galiano, 
Malaspina, Restless, and Newington 
were performing many of the same 
tasks that today’s MCDVs and 
ORCAs are playing on the West 
A recruiting poster for the RNCVR 
overseas division whose request for 
Canadians to serve with the “Imperial 
Royal Navy” emphasizes the stereotype 
that the RNCVR was little more than a 
feeder force for the empire.
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Coast. Acting as a harbinger of things 
to come, Kingsmill even went so far as 
to create a plan in March 1918 which 
was designed to take advantage of 
the navigationally challenging waters 
off British Columbia to train RNCVR 
watch-keeping officers on Malaspina 
and Galiano. Using language that 
actually describes aspects of modern 
officer training on the west coast, 
Kingsmill noted that the ships were 
“to cruise among the Islands in 
order that they may have practical 
instruction in navigation as far as 
is practical. A class of six [RNCVR 
officers] should be sent at a time. 
The vessel[s] to return to Esquimalt 
each evening.”37 It is these types of 
similarities with today’s west coast 
reserve fleet that further suggests 
that Galiano, Malaspina, Newington 
and Restless had not only evolved 
into a proto west coast naval reserve 
fleet, but also makes them direct 
descendants of today’s MCDVs and 
ORCA classes. 
 The destruction of Von Spee’s 
squadron off the Falkland Islands 
early in the war, and later America’s 
entry into the conflict, meant that 
this proto-reserve fleet had little to 
fear from any German threat, but 
there were other dangers associated 
with sailing in these waters. The 
October 1918 storm that sank Galiano 
was certainly a good example of the 
extreme weather that often plagued 
the area. Packing winds of over 100 
knots and with seas reaching 45 feet, 
the colossal storm of 1918, which 
one observer described as “just one 
mass of white foam,” was responsible 
for many deaths - including the 350 
passengers and crew of the CPR ship 
Sophia.38 Galiano’s involvement with 
this storm began with an urgent 
signal from the Triangle Island 
wireless station advising that it was 
on the verge of running out of much 
needed supplies and gasoline. This 
put naval officials in Esquimalt in a 
difficult position. Weather reports 
suggested that there was a small 
window of opportunity to get a ship 
out to the island before the storm 
arrived.39 A decision was therefore 
made to send Malaspina, but thanks 
to a collision with a jetty that crushed 
her bow, Galiano was sent instead. 
 Although Galiano was in need of 
her own maintenance – boiler work 
and repairs to the main bearing of 
her tail shaft – it was deemed that 
she was seaworthy and up to the 
task. This did little to alleviate the 
crew’s concerns. Some were even 
scared. The area between Cape Scott 
and Cape St. James, which they 
simply called “the Triangle,” had a 
reputation as being “the worst piece 
of water on the Pacific Coast,” and 
reports that the approaching storm 
An undated photo of the ship’s company of HMCS Galiano.
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had already devoured a large victim 
like the steamer Sophia only made 
matters worse. Many crewmembers 
wrote home and confided their fears 
to loved ones. “[We are] leaving on 
‘a dangerous trip’ to carry food and 
supplies to the civilians [on Triangle 
Island]” 16-year-old Roderick 
McLeod wrote to his family, a concern 
that was echoed by shipmate James 
Reeves who told his wife that “This 
is going to be an awful trip.”40 But it 
was James Aird who best captured 
the crew’s apprehension about what 
lay ahead: “We are running into 
very stormy weather since leaving 
Vancouver. I don’t think we will be 
home until the end of November…I 
dread the Triangle.”41 Unfortunately, 
for too many British Columbian 
families this was the last they would 
hear from their loved ones.
 The fact that 25 of her 39 sailors 
had listed their next of kin as residents 
of British Columbia (compared to 
three from Alberta, six from the 
United Kingdom, two from Quebec, 
two from the United States and one 
from New Brunswick), strongly 
suggests that RNCVR manning on 
the Pacific coast was a local affair, 
the more so since various newspaper 
reports were quick to emphasize 
the local connections between the 
province and its missing reservists. 
Headlines such as “Victorians 
shocked” and “Vancouver Men 
on board” were followed by vivid 
personal stories about the crew and 
their grieving communities. The 
town of Nanaimo was particularly 
hard hit after it was discovered 
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that four of its citizens had been 
serving on the ship. A well-known 
member of the RNCVR orchestra, 
21-year-old George Douglas Stanley 
Bate was remembered for his days 
learning the candy-making trade in 
Nanaimo as well as his ability as an 
amateur actor and director of the 
New Westminster Dramatic Society. 
New Westminster, on the other 
hand, was mourning its own loss. 
Affectionately known throughout 
the town as “Tabe,” Arthur Hume, 
who had been a fireman on the Great 
Northern railway before joining the 
RNCVR, was a popular figure whose 
mother received tremendous local 
support after her son’s body was 
one of the few that were recovered. 
Similar stories of grief and loss were 
played out all over the province and 
in other parts of Canada, the US and 
the UK, but some accounts were more 
heart-wrenching than others. None, 
however, was more painful than the 
Nanaimo mother who successfully 
petitioned the navy to have her son 
transferred from the east to west coast 
which, while bringing him closer to 
home as she had hoped, effectively 
led to his death on the ill-fated 
Galiano.42
 Fate was also wonderfully 
merciful on that day. The Spanish Flu, 
which would claim approximately 18 
million victims world-wide, actually 
proved a lifesaver for at least eight 
members of the Galiano’s crew who 
found themselves laid up in the base’s 
hospital rather than at sea with the 
ship.43 Of course, their replacements 
were not nearly so lucky. Indeed, 
the people of South Vancouver were 
saddened to discover that Joseph 
Gilbert, a “well known” citizen and 
father of four, was on Galiano rather 
serving in his usual capacity as a 
reservist on Rainbow.44 Other accounts 
described some of those lost as 
“leading citizens” or “popular young 
Victorian[s]” who had joined the 
RNCVR “to serve Canada” further 
illustrate that Galiano’s reserve crew 
were truly representative of the 
province and country that had sent 
them to war. Yet it was a relative of 
Able Seaman William Stafford who 
best captured the appreciation that 
was felt for Galiano’s lost reservists. 
After recording that the telegram 
informing him of his brother’s 
death was a “grief to my heart,” 
he continued with the patriotic 
observation that “like others we must 
bravely pay the price of freedom.”45
 As with those on the Galiano, 
the RNCVRs serving on the other 
ships of the West Coast’s proto-
reserve fleet were also facing the 
possibility that they too might have 
to pay the ultimate price. Their fates, 
fortunately, were not nearly so tragic. 
Newington, for instance, reverted to 
government work until she was sold 
to commercial interests in 1937, while 
Restless’s log entry for 31 December 
1918 captured her inglorious last 
day in the RCN, simply observing 
that “the Restless was paid off PM 
today. This log kept by VGL Larsen 
Maker who has been demobilized.”46 
Malaspina would continue her service 
in the navy until 31 March 1920 at 
which point she reverted back to 
being a Canadian Government Ship. 
Malaspina still carried out some 
naval work providing sea-training 
for cadets from the Royal Naval 
College of Canada in addition to her 
fisheries patrol work. She would not 
be paid off until 24 January 1945 after 
serving once again as an HMC ship 
performing patrol, examination, and 
training duties during the Second 
World War.47 The storm of October 
1918 robbed Galiano of the chance to 
share this future.
 According to the findings of the 
navy’s board of inquiry, Galiano was 
lost around 0320 hours on 30 October 
approximately 20 miles off Cape St. 
James. Without survivors no definite 
cause could be attributed to the 
sinking, but the available evidence 
led to the conclusion that: 
….she foundered in terrific weather. 
It may safely be assumed that the 
loss was in no way attributed to any 
failure on the part of the machinery 
or weakness of the hull and structure 
of the vessel; immediately before 
encountering their heavy gale, she 
was to all intents and purposes a 
sound and efficient vessel.48
No one disagreed with the notion that 
the storm was the primary cause of 
the loss, but theories quickly emerged 
on possible contributing factors. 
Much of this was the product of 
Galiano’s reputation as a particularly 
seaworthy ship. Stories about Galiano 
encountering “fierce storms” while 
rounding Cape Horn on her maiden 
voyage from Ireland stood as a 
testament to her ability to survive 
rough weather. Indeed, Galiano’s 
first officer, who was one of those 
who had missed the sinking due to 
the flu, had trouble believing that 
she had foundered, telling the Board 
that “I say and have always said 
that I would go around the world in 
her at any time.” Holmes Newcomb 
a g r e e d .  H a v i n g  c o m m a n d e d 
Galiano’s sister ship, Malaspina, for 
the past five years, Newcomb told 
a Victoria reporter that he believed 
“it was hardly possible for Galiano to 
founder without striking the rocks” 
while another sailor made a similar 
statement claiming that “she must 
have struck something as this is the 
only way she could have sunk.”49
 Another theory held that a rogue 
wave must have overwhelmed the 
ship by breaking over Galiano’s 
stern and flooding her holds. The 
evidence to support this theory was 
best summarized by the captain of the 
trawler, GE Foster, who, after finding 
the body of one of Galiano’s crew 
members as well as some wreckage, 
argued that: 
there seems to be no doubt to me but 
that the vessel has foundered in the 
heavy seas…It is possible that one 
of these unlucky seas was shipped 
by the Galiano and with the weight 
of water rolling around inside her, 
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her bulkheads would soon give 
way, causing her to roll more and 
ship other seas. The man we picked 
up had on a lifebelt, which had 
evidently been fastened in a hurry, 
as it was not done correctly, and 
his clothes bore the appearance of 
having been hurriedly put on, as if he 
had tumbled out of his bunk before 
rushing on deck. There is every 
probability that as the ship filled, the 
air in her cabins blew the skylight, 
which we picked up.50
The captain of the Foster, at least, 
was convinced that Galiano had 
swamped. 
 That enough water could get 
into the ship to completely flood the 
holds proved a difficult pill for some 
to swallow, particularly since the 
recovered skylight was fastened tight, 
evidence that the ship was battened 
down for rough weather. As a result, 
a third theory emerged suggesting 
Galiano had been somehow disabled, 
leaving her “helpless in the face of 
the storm and pounded by the terrific 
seas she may have foundered.”51 
There was some evidence to support 
this theory as well. As a result of 
Malaspina’s accident, Galiano never 
had a chance to get either the boiler 
work or the repairs on her tail 
shaft’s main bearing done prior to 
sailing, meaning that some problem 
emerging from these defects may 
have come back to haunt the ship. 
The steamship Gray, after spotting the 
Galiano heading West North West, at 
2200 hours, reported that the warship 
was travelling at an unusually slow 
speed. Proponents of this version of 
the sinking, however, could never 
explain why Pope would not have 
reported such a malfunction while 
he had the chance. 
 A search of Galiano’s construction 
files yields yet another hypothesis 
which suggests that the ship’s design 
possibly was a contributing factor 
in her loss. This new theory was the 
product of concerns over Galiano and 
Malaspina’s stability that were first 
expressed by the superintendant 
of construction and Canada’s chief 
naval architect, Mr R. Newman. 
Having had a chance to discuss these 
matters with Newman, the Dublin 
Dockyard Company reported back 
to Ottawa that: 
…his [Newman’s] points were 
mostly with reference to stability 
of the vessel, due to the higher 
centre of gravity of the Single Screw 
engines, the slightly larger boiler, 
very heavy boats, teak bridge deck, 
etc., the stability of the vessel does 
not compare very well… even 
though we have increased the beam 
as suggested by 2’. We are now 
providing for the fitting of 20 to 
30 tons of permanent ballast into 
the vessel, and it is principally for 
this reason that we wish to reduce 
the deadweight asked for. …Our 
calculations however allow for no 
margin and it is in view of this that 
we submitted these alternatives to 
Mr. Newman, and we also propose 
to increase the beam by a further 4” 
or 5”.52
This, however, was not enough 
for Newman, who, after further 
examining the builders’ specifications, 
observed that “the boat as designed is 
stable under all conditions other than 
at light draft, when the G.M. becomes 
minus 0.6 of foot. …for safety I would 
strongly recommend that if possible 
the beam be made 27 feet.”53 An 
official notation on this memo shows 
that Canadian authorities agreed 
with Newman’s assessment, and as 
a result the builders were asked to 
extend the beam by another half a 
foot. 
 In fairness to the builders, the 
Canadians had asked for a number 
of changes and additions to the 
original design and consequently 
the Dublin Dockyard Company’s 
response simply claimed that the 
stability issue “has already been fully 
dealt with, and it’s quite impossible 
to [further] alter the beam at this 
stage.”54 The builder had a point. 
Dublin Dockyard Company had 
already placed orders for steel 
based on agreed requirements and 
satisfying the Canadian requests for 
alterations was proving exceedingly 
difficult. They were, however, willing 
to entertain some of these suggestions 
for change from Canada. Newman 
was not impressed and he expressed 
his concerns at every opportunity 
to the point where the builders 
complained to Canada that: 
We see no reason for Mr. Newman 
to become uneasy as everything is 
going on satisfactory, unless with 
“Five little sailor boys” - APS Galiano.
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respect to the suggestion to change 
the beam… We would like you to 
give Mr. Newman assurance that 
we are making satisfactory progress, 
and that there is really no need for his 
presence here at present. We regret to 
notice that Mr. Newman is somewhat 
impatient but do not think there is 
the slightest reason for it.55
That the Dublin shipbuilders were 
growing frustrated with Newman’s 
comments was obvious when they 
began chastising the Canadian 
government for a situation where 
it was asking for changes to the 
design on the one hand, while on 
the other one of its representatives 
was complaining that these same 
modifications were putting these 
ships’ stability at risk. This explains 
why Dublin Dockyard Company sent 
a message to Ottawa warning that: 
There are many cases before our 
minds where contractors unwittingly 
allowed owners to go on piling 
up weights with most disastrous 
results in the end, and discredit to 
all concerned. It has always been our 
practice in the past to watch this most 
carefully, and we would be much 
obliged for your kind assistance. 
If the speed has been designed for 
a speed of 11 or 12 knots, liberties 
could have been taken with them 
that are not possible with the subjects 
before us.56
 Worse yet, the company would 
go so far as to tell the Canadian 
government they were “a little 
surprised that so many alterations 
from the proposals” was approved 
by the department which was 
“causing a great deal of uncertainly 
and much delay,” and that many 
of the company’s suggestions to 
meet the stability issue were not 
only being ignored, but also that 
their “hopes” of rectifying these 
problems had largely “vanished.”57 
The fact that these stability issues 
were never fully addressed (and that 
Galiano’s beam was not extended to 
the full degree recommended) was 
significant. Moreover, it is intriguing 
that Galiano, which had just unloaded 
at Triangle, would have been at 
light draft, meaning that Newman’s 
original fears about that the vessel’s 
negative stability in an unloaded 
state may have been well-founded. 
Of course, the navy was not aware 
of these earlier disputes nor was it 
interested in exploring any theory 
which could not be supported by 
sufficient evidence. 
 There was, however, one mystery 
that did catch the board’s attention. 
On the day before the sinking Pope 
sent a message to Esquimalt from 
Triangle Island noting that the 
approach of threatening weather 
was forcing an early departure, and 
as a result he had little choice but 
to leave some of the supplies he 
had just delivered below the high 
water mark. What the board could 
not understand, therefore, was why 
Pope was even sailing for Ikeda, 
particularly since the confidential 
mail that he was delivering to the 
station was not so important as 
to justify his heading into such a 
fierce storm. In their search for a 
solution, the board members turned 
to the men who knew Pope best. 
Newcomb was the first man on their 
list, but unfortunately his answer 
only added to the mystery of why a 
normally cautious commander had 
taken such a risk. When asked what 
course he would steer to make Cape 
St. James light, Newcomb was direct 
in responding: 
Unless I could possibly help it I 
wouldn’t make the run from Triangle 
at night at this time of year… I 
consider this one of the worse 
pieces of water that it is possible 
to imagine… On account of the 
strong tides and currents and heavy 
confused sea between Cape St. James 
and Triangle, and I wouldn’t like to 
cross there except in daylight and in 
fine weather. 58 
With each witness the mystery 
continued to deepen. For instance, 
when Pope’s former first officer, 
E.G. Alcock was asked if it was “the 
practice of Captain Pope to do this 
trip from Triangle to Ikeda regardless 
of weather” Alcock answered with 
an emphatic “No.” Four years of 
sailing together had left Alcock with 
the single impression that Pope was 
a “very cautious” commander, and 
as a result the attempt to reach Ikeda 
was not only out of character, but also 
simply did not make sense.59 Other 
former crew members made similar 
statements and an explanation of 
why this cautious commander made 
a seemingly mad dash across a 
treacherous stretch of water with an 
approaching storm remained elusive. 
Yet a careful examination of Pope’s 
command of Galiano does offer some 
clues as to why he took such a risk.
 One event in particular, which 
occurred in a gale on the morning 
of 10 January 1915, appears to have 
“The Bosun lost at sea” - APS Galiano.
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a direct bearing on the 
events of 29-30 October 
1918. After receiving orders 
to investigate a vessel 
reportedly dragging her 
cable off Royal Roads, 
Pope set sail only to end up 
grounding his own ship. 
The damage to Galiano 
was  considerable  and 
the subsequent Board of 
Inquiry into this incident 
was merciless, concluding 
that the stranding “was 
due to want of almost every 
proper precaution on the 
part of the Commanding 
Officer.” Worse, they went 
even further by observing 
that Pope’s “gross neglect 
of duty” should result in 
his being permanently 
rel ieved of  command. 
Kingsmill, however, came 
to Pope’s rescue and while 
he agreed with the general 
findings of the court he 
was not convinced that the 
punishment fit the offense.60 
The DNS’s defence of Pope 
was understandable. Not 
only had he handpicked 
Pope for command, but 
Kingsmill had himself once 
grounded a ship, off Souris 
Point,  Chaleur Bay, in 
1906. That earlier incident, 
which was the product of an 
unfortunate string of events 
where the navigating officer 
misidentified a number of 
key landmarks, nonetheless 
had a negative impact on 
Kingsmill’s career prospects 
in  the  RN as  he  was 
eventually relieved of his 
command of HMS Dominion 
for an older battleship of 
the Royal Sovereign class.61 
K i n g s m i l l ’ s  p e r s o n a l 
c o m m a n d  h i s t o r y , 
therefore, likely play a role 
in his sympathetic attitude 
towards Pope, the more so 
since he had determined 
Galiano’s grounding took 
place “under extraordinary 
condit ions and not  in 
the ordinary course of 
navigation.” Moreover, as 
Kingsmill would further 
explain to the deputy 
minister, Pope was “a good 
officer and his services have 
been very useful.”62 
 Kingsmill’s defence of 
his officer, which resulted 
in a lesser punishment 
of the loss of two years 
seniority and a warning to 
be cautious in the future, 
was appreciated, but Pope 
could not forgive himself. 
He therefore sent a heart-
filled apology to Kingsmill, 
explaining that: 
I feel that it is necessary to 
write to you to express my 
regret for the accident that 
befell this ship. I am sorry 
that I have jeopardized the 
confidence that I felt you had 
in me, that I feel more than 
anything else and can only 
hope that my work in the 
future will restore it.”63
 Pope’s confidence was 
clearly shaken but two other 
incidents, both in June 1918, 
only made matters worse. 
The first occurred on 22 June 
when Galiano ran aground 
off Disappointment Inlet, 
and then the vessel struck 
a rock on the following 
day. Once again, Pope was 
found responsible as this 
Board of Inquiry concluded 
that he had made an “error 
in judgement” in not giving 
the extending shoal a wide 
enough berth, while a failure 
to correct his charts – which 
showed a spar rather than 
a new can buoy – resulted 
in the rock strike. Pope 
D
N
D
/C
F 
CN
-3
3
2
6
This man’s cap-tally, which reads “RNCVR Pacific,” 
perfectly captures the link between the RNCVR and its 
role in providing for the local maritime defence needs of 
British Columbia.
Mayne - Galiano.indd   18 4/15/2010   3:40:16 PM
14
Canadian Military History, Vol. 19 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol19/iss1/2
19
actually had a legitimate defence in 
the second incident where he argued 
that, regardless of the actual type, the 
buoy marking the rock was not in its 
charted position – a claim that was 
later verified by federal officials. 64 
However, this did not change the fact 
that Galiano was kept alongside for 30 
days to repair the $25,000 damage for 
which the navy had told Pope he was 
to blame. 65 
 The impact of repeatedly being 
reprimanded and told to be more 
cautious appears to have had a 
significant effect on Pope, who, 
according to one of his subordinates, 
was  a lready an overcaut ious 
commander: “in very bad weather – 
thick weather he was a bit nervous. I 
have found it more so after running 
on the rock on the west coast…Any 
little thing that happened he was 
irritable.”66 As a result, a mixture of 
bad encounters with Pacific weather 
and difficult navigation conditions 
had conspired to turn a good and 
solid commander into a somewhat 
erratic one. Upon closer examination, 
Pope should not have been so tough 
on himself. Other commanders had 
certainly had their fair share of 
incidents. Moreover, the fact that 
Galiano and Malaspina’s builders 
were specifically told in 1912 that 
the Canadian government wanted 
a robust design because “much of 
the water in which these boats will 
operate has not yet been charted” 
is even more significant since it 
represents a clear indication that 
the Fisheries Protection Service 
understood the danger these ships 
would confront in British Columbia.67 
 When viewed through the prism 
of the navigational challenges that 
commanding officers faced on the 
West Coast, Pope’s actions on the 
night of the sinking are easier to 
explain. Rather than running the risk 
of a fourth incident – Triangle Island 
was a notoriously bad anchorage 
where dragging cable and grounding 
in a storm were real possibilities – the 
available evidence suggest that Pope 
was trying to reach the relatively 
safe waters of Ikeda where his ship 
would be in a much better position 
to weather the storm. For the Victoria 
media, however, Pope had taken a 
considerable risk on that day, telling 
their readers that “The men of the 
Galiano… have ventured into rough 
places [before]... This time they took 
a chance and lost.” Such a conclusion 
is one-sided and perhaps even a little 
harsh – anchoring at Triangle could 
have also led to disaster – but the 
true significance of Pope’s experience 
is that it shows exactly how Pacific 
navigation and weather conditions 
haunted one particular RNCVR 
officer and impacted his decisions. 
 Galiano’s story is also important 
because of what it reveals about the 
seagoing history of the West Coast’s 
early naval reserve. An analysis of 
Galiano’s activities throughout the 
war shows that this ship, along with 
Malaspina, Restless and Newington, 
experienced an evolutionary process 
that effectively saw the Pacific 
RNCVR merge with the men of the 
Fisheries Protection Service to create 
a proto sea-going reserve fleet on 
the West Coast. Carrying out many 
of the same functions as the modern 
West Coast seagoing reserves, this 
small First World War patrol force 
represents a direct descendent of 
today’s Pacific MCDVs and ORCAs. 
Moreover, as was illustrated by 
the response to Galiano’s loss, the 
contribution that the ships of this 
early reserve fleet made to the local 
maritime defence of the province was 
not forgotten by the population of 
British Columbia as their presence set 
a powerful example for the reservists 
who followed in their footsteps. Yet 
their efforts were important for other 
reasons as well. The fact that the 
RCN had ships manned exclusively 
with Canadian reservists protecting 
British Columbian waters suggests 
that the birth of the modern naval 
reserves began not with Walter 
Hose’s efforts in 1923, but rather 
with the pioneering enthusiasms of 
a group of Victorian patriots one 
decade earlier. And perhaps that 
is the way their contribution to the 
early defence of Canada’s West Coast 
should be remembered. 
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